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COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 TERM
that the Commission, operating under the new statute, could not reaffirm the
determination of the annulled proceedings but decided that all information avail-
able, including the findings of the annulled proceeding, could have been consid-
ered by the Commission and were reviewable by the Court.8 As to the failure of
the Commission to properly notify the petitioner as required by the amended
statute,9 the Court held that such failure was not so prejudicial as to &mand
recbnsideration and reaffirmation by the Commission for a valid denial. An admin-
istrative denial unaccompanied by specific factual findings does not satisfy the
statute in most cases;' 0 however, in the present case the petitioner was adequately
represented by counsel before the Commission in the annulled proceedings and
the Court deemed this sufficient notification of the Commission's grounds for
denial.
The Court did not feel it was impeded in its review by the general character
of the denial by the Commission'" and seemed reluctant to find the refusal
arbitrary even though there had not been strict compliance by the Commission
with the amended statute. While the Court did not demand literal compliance,
it felt that the safeguards of the statute were preserved to the petitioner in the
instant case. A dangerous precedent has not been set in view of the statement of
the Court that in most cases of an administrative denial unaccompanied by specific
factual findings stricter compliance would be required.12
Review of Administrative Defermination
In view of a serious post-war housing shortage, the legislature in 1946 estab-
lished the Temporary State Housing Rent Commission in the interests of public
health, safety, and general welfare to provide regulations to assure the maintenance
of "the same ... essential services . . ." to tenants as they enjoyed before the bill
became effective.'
3
In First Terrace Gardens, Inc. v. McGoldrick'4 the Court held that the
evidence sustained a determination by the Rent Administrator that tenants of a
8. People ex rel. Empire Trotting Club v. State Racing Comm., 190 N. Y.
31, 82 N. E. 723, (1907); Grannan v. Westchester Racing Assn., 153 N. Y. 449,
47 N. E. 896 (1897); Agoglia v. Mulrooney, 259 N. Y. 462, 182 N. E. 84 (1922).
9. See text of Act at note 3, supra.
10. Perpente v. Moss, 293 N. Y. 325, 56 N. E. 2d 726 (1944); In Scudder v.
O'Connell, 272 App. Div. 251, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 607 (1st Dep't 1947), where the State
Liquor Authority denied reconsideration of its denial of an application for
a license on facts and factors that were not disclosed to the petitioner, it was
noted: ". . . (I)t ought not to be necessary for an applicant to start a pro-
ceeding under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act in order to learn why he
has been turned down."
11. Barry v. O'ConneZl, 303 N. Y. 46, 100 N. E. 2d 127 (1951); Newbrand
v. City of Yonkers, 285 N. Y. 164, 33 N. E. 2d 75 (1941).
12. See note 10, supra.
13. N. Y. Sess. Laws 1946, c. 274 §4(5).
14. 1. N. Y. 2d 1, 132 N. E. 2d 887 (1956).
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large group of apartment buildings would be deprived of essential services to a
substantial extent if the landlord's proposed conversions were approved. Among
the requested alterations were the changing of elevators from manual to automatic
operation, and elimination of separate lobbies from each adjoining building, sub-
stituting therefor two centralized lobbies with corridors affording access to outlying
buildings. The Administrator determined that personal protection of the tenants
would be sacrificed by such a change and that a compromise protection plan
submitted by the owner was insufficient to afford the same protection from
intruders now assured by the physical presence of elevator operators.
The regulating powers of the Commission were early reasoned to be adminis-
trative in nature15 and as such they involve an exercise of judgment or discretion
which is reviewable.1' However, the Court will refuse to upset a determination of
an administrative body if the order has warrant in the record and a reasonable
basis in law.17 The issue then is whether or not the determination was arbitrary,
whimsical, or capricious.' 8 The dissent adopted the minority opinion of the
Appellate Division that in view of previous lease reservations the owner had
secured a right to certain conversions and that it became an unreasonable denial
of fundamental property rights for the commission to disallow the request
unconditionally.'9
Finding the determination of the administrative body to be not wholly un-
warranted it was incumbent upon the Court to sustain it. The dissent here would
require a departure from the settled law20 by substituting its judgment for that of
an administrative body, requiring the administrator to reconsider a determination
which they did not hold to be originally arbitrary or capricious.
Review-Statute of Limitafions
A proceeding under Article 78 may be brought to compel the performance
of a duty specifically enjoined by law2 ' or to review a determination.22 Article 78
15. Longo v. Tauriello, 201 Misc. 35, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
16. N. Y. Civ. PPAc. AcT. art. 78, §§1283 et seq.
17. Mounting & Finishing Co., Inc. v. McGoldriclk, 294 N. Y. 104, 60 N. E. 2d
825 (1945).
18. Stern v. MeCaffery, 279 App. Div. 461, 110 N. Y. S. 2d 705 (1st Dep't
1952), aff'd., 304 N. Y. 828, 109 N. E. 2d 611 (1952).
19. First Terrace Gardens, Inc. v. McGoldriclk, 285 App. Dlv. 1126, 140
N. Y. S. 2d 447 (1st Dep't 1955).
20. Marbury v. Cole, 286 N. Y. 202, 36 N. E. 2d 113 (1941); see note 18
supra.
21. N. Y. Civ. PPAc. AcT §1284 (3). The expression "to compel performance
of a duty specifically enjoined by law" refers to all other relief heretofore
available in a mandamus proceeding.
22. N. Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT §1284(2). The expression "to review a deter-
mination" refers to relief heretofore available in certiorari or a mandamus
proceeding for the review of any act ... of a body . .. exercising ... admin-
istrative . . . functions, which involves an exercise of judgment . ...
